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Abstract 
 
The United States military is performing operations in urban environments with 
increasing frequency.  Current Department of Defense doctrine is poorly suited to train 
and equip today’s warriors with the tools and experience necessary to fight and win in 
modern sprawling cities.  In order to “close the gap,” the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s 
Joint Experimentation Directorate led an effort to run a massively distributed simulation 
of a synthetic urban environment utilizing human-in-the-loop operators called URBAN 
RESOLVE.  The synthetic environment simulated the city of Jakarta with over 1,000,000 
buildings and structures and over 120,000 civilian entities.  A Red force retreated into the 
city while a Blue force attempted to determine the enemy’s Order of Battle.  The exercise 
generated over 3.7 terabytes of data in seven distinct trials.  This research evaluated the 
time required to identify targets after detection and the accumulation of identifications 
over time, and searched for trends between the seven design trials and between target 
groups.  Two trends emerged from this research.  First, there was a notable difference in 
the time required to identify a target once it has been detected based on its target group.  
Second, two design trials that are expected to demonstrate show counter-intuitive results. 
. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
Background 
In the history of warfare, one of the enduring truths has always been, attack cities 
as a last resort.  In The Art of War Sun Tzu wrote, “The worst policy is to attack cities.  
Attack cities only when there is no alternative…”  (Tzu, 1971:78-79).  Among other 
difficulties and complications, Sun Tzu recognized the extreme difficulty of attacking 
walled cities.  Successfully laying siege to such a city, while possible, required expending 
vast amounts of materiel and human resources.  There are few walled cities left in the 
world today, and the lethality of modern weapons eliminates their utility as an effective 
defense against attack.  Nevertheless, modern urban combat presents its own host of 
difficulties.  Wholesale bombing of cities and the ensuing civilian casualties is both 
unnecessary and politically unacceptable.  What is more is the realization that it is no 
longer enough for the United States to defeat its enemies; we must make all efforts to 
provide stability and establish a culture of democracy.  The result is that the United States 
finds itself not only in the unenviable position of engaging in open urban combat 
operations, but also performing peace keeping and stability operations against an 
insurgency bent on hastening our departure.   
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The challenge facing the Department of Defense (DoD) is developing the tactics, 
training, and equipment that will prepare our forces to fight in such urban scenarios.  
Before the end of the cold war, the DoD’s primary focus was to prepare for a massive 
force on force battle against the USSR.  Although urban combat was sure to take place as 
the battle raged across the European continent, little attention was given to the needs of 
effective urban combat.  What little attention there was, focused primarily on small 
villages and full force combat not peace keeping and stability operations in a sprawling 
metropolis with millions of people, and millions of buildings and structures (Fontenot, 
2003).  However, recent advances in computer technology, experimental architecture 
design, networking, and a renewed focus in light of events in the Middle East, has 
resulted in the genesis of large scale distributed synthetic environments designed to 
provide the command and control warrior the ability to practice operations in a modern 
urban landscape. 
URBAN RESOLVE is a three-phase exercise sponsored by U.S. Joint Forces 
Command’s (JFCOM) Joint Experimentation directorate (J9).  The goal of URBAN 
RESOLVE is to “… guide the development of critical warfighting capabilities for the 
future joint force commander, with a particular focus on those needed for effective urban 
operations,” (Urban, 2006).  At its essence, URBAN RESOLVE provides a mechanism to 
evaluate the utility of near-future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
assets within the urban environment and to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTP) to aid the joint forces commander in gaining situational awareness of enemy 
activities. 
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URBAN RESOLVE utilizes the Joint Semi-Automated Forces synthetic 
environment to allow real-time human-in-the-loop (HITL) interaction by both a Blue and 
Red force within a synthetic version of the Indonesian capital of Jakarta complete with 
over 1,000,000 buildings and over 120,000 non-combatants moving about the city in a 
culturally accurate manner (Wielhouwer, 2005:12-13 and Rafuse, 2006).  URBAN 
RESOLVE participants control a constellation of approximately 250 ISR assets that 
generate tracks from approximately 1100 enemy targets attempting to hide within the 
city’s civilian population. 
A critical aspect of such a large simulation is the massive data collection and data 
analysis needs.  A single twenty-four hour run of URBAN RESOLVE generated 
approximately 100 gigabytes of data and over forty million rows of data.  The entire first 
phase, which consisted of seven experimental designs, generated over 3.5 terabytes of 
storage space.  Yet despite all this data there was only a single replication for each 
experimental design.  The lack of replications presents difficulties when performing 
statistical analysis due to the inability to make assumptions about the data such as 
normality and independence. 
Problem Statement 
This thesis analyzes data produced from the exercise URBAN RESOLVE Phase I 
by manipulating the data into various formats and using nonparametric statistics in order 
to find trends in the data that will provide additional insight into the results of the 
exercise.  The challenge for this research effort is to analyze a dataset containing over 40 
million rows of data totaling 3.7 terabytes in size.  In addition, there are only single 
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replications for each of the seven experimental design trials.  Finally, the experimental 
design varied multiple design parameters between trials and made it difficult to determine 
the exact cause of changes observed from trial to trial. 
Scope 
This research effort will focus on the track-data collected during URBAN 
RESOLVE Phase I.  The data consists of the complete listing of all tracks generated 
when a Blue force sensor detects a target within the simulation.  The data includes target 
type, detecting sensor, and detection time.  If identification was made, the data also 
includes the identifying sensor and time of identification.  Analysis will focus specifically 
on the time required to identify a target (TTI), after a detection has occurred, and how 
that time varies between design trials, target groups (soldiers, civilians, mechanized, etc), 
and the detecting platform.  This research will also investigate the rate at which 
identifications are generated for each trial and target group.  The intent is to search for 
trends in the data that have not been previously identified, and which may indicate areas 
for further study. 
Outline 
The literature review chapter provides an overview of modeling and simulation in 
the Department of Defense (DoD), a look at combat modeling past and present, the 
growing importance of urban combat, virtual simulation, synthetic environments, and 
finally URBAN RESOLVE.  The methodology chapter will discuss the URBAN 
RESOLVE experimental architecture, experiment design, data collection and reduction, 
and finally data analysis.  Chapter IV will present the results of our data analysis and 
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Chapter V will provide a synopsis of the analysis, obstacles encountered, the significance 
of the research and finally recommendations for future research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the various aspects of 
combat modeling in a real-time high-resolution synthetic environment.  Particular 
attention will be paid to combat modeling’s ability to aid in understanding the complex 
urban battlefield.  This chapter begins with a general discussion of modeling and 
simulation and their applications within the DoD.  This is followed by an overview of 
attrition based combat modeling and its limits.  Next will be a discussion of the increased 
role of urban combat and asymmetrical conflicts faced by the U.S. military.  Following 
this is a discussion of synthetic environments and the challenges faced in creating 
applicable synthetic urban environments and modeling asymmetrical threat behavior.  
Finally, this chapter will discuss the Joint Forces Command sponsored exercise URBAN 
RESOLVE. 
Modeling and Simulation 
According to the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO), modeling 
and simulation in the DoD is broken into three functional areas: training, analysis, and 
acquisition.  Models can be further categorized based on their resolution and level of 
aggregation.  DoD5000.59-M, Department of Defense Modeling and Simulation (M & S) 
Glossary (1998), defines resolution and aggregation as, “The degree of detail and 
precision used in the representation of real world aspects in a model or simulation,” and 
“The ability to group entities while preserving the effects of entity behavior and 
interaction while grouped,” respectively.  The DoD Services each have extensive libraries 
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of models and simulations they use to satisfy these various functional areas.  These 
models span the spectrum from modeling airfoil fluid dynamics, to operational planning 
of a major theater war.  Functionally, they range from training operators in weapon 
system simulators, analyzing the effects of integrating a new weapon system into the 
inventory, and supporting the effectiveness and suitability determination of an acquisition 
program.  The DMSO Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository (MSRR) contains 
hundreds of government accepted models and simulations that may be used for analysis 
within the DoD.  The hierarchy and functional areas of models and simulations used by 
the DoD are represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Hierarchy and Functional Areas of DoD Combat Models (DoD 
5000.59-P, 1995) 
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Combat Modeling 
Combat modeling has historically focused on modeling the attrition of forces in 
open combat.  Effectively modeling a complex event such as combat typically requires 
some minimal level of aggregation.  Even with the aid of computers, aggregation is often 
required for a timely answer due to limits of processing speed and storage requirements.  
The work of Frederick W. Lanchester has dominated combat modeling attrition analysis 
since World War I.  In 1914, Lanchester described warfare using two basic models.  The 
first, based on “ancient” warfare, assumes a battle to be a collection of one-on-one duels 
and results in a casualty exchange ratio proportional to force size.  The second model, 
based on “modern” warfare, attempts to capture the effects of weapon lethality and the 
ability to concentrate fire, which can result in a many-on-one scenario.  Here the casualty 
exchange ratio is inversely proportional to the size of the enemy force.  These two models 
are termed the Linear and Square laws respectively (Hartman, 1997:6-2)  
The Lanchester attrition models aggregate warfare.  In doing so, they treat all 
combatants identically, and ignore differences in individual combatants such as skill, 
state of alertness, equipment state of repair, lethality, logistics, complex terrain, 
intelligence etc.  Over the years, manipulations of the basic equations have allowed for 
heterogeneous applications of the Lanchester models that attempt to mitigate some of the 
above limitations.  However, none of the various additions or complications are able to 
capture the impact of maneuver warfare, information, command and control (C2), civilian 
casualty avoidance, and asymmetric warfare.  When modeling at the theater level of war 
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in a force-on-force scenario, these facts may be of little consequence.  However, modern 
warfare is increasingly dependant on C2, intelligence, and maneuver. 
Urban Combat 
The battlefield of modern warfare is changing as well.  In the post-cold war era, 
the United States has demonstrated its ability to prosecute a conventional force-on-force 
battle with relative ease.  Unfortunately, our adversaries have noticed this too and avoid 
open combat whenever possible.  In addition, US deployments abroad have grown in 
number as the world has become more urbanized and the US finds itself performing 
combat operations in the urban environment with increasing regularity (Wielhouwer, 
2005:2-5).  In the US Army’s analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom, On Point (2003), the 
authors discuss the fact that the 1991 Gulf War showed the Iraqi military the futility of 
facing coalition forces in open desert combat.  Their reaction to this stark reality became 
apparent in 2003 as they massed their forces in urban areas such as Baghdad.  Although 
victory was swift, the on going insurgency shows that the urban environment is where the 
US is likely to face its greatest future challenge.  Finally, US military operations will 
continue to include military operations other than war (MOOTW) in the urban 
environment with ever-increasing frequency (Wielhouwer, 2005:2). 
 An important acknowledgment made in On Point (2003), is the DoD’s 
critical weakness at developing effective joint doctrine, tactics, and training for the 
modern urban environment.  Until recently, urban combat training facilities were limited 
to simulating small towns and villages, rather than the vast urban metropolises common 
today.  Furthermore, DoD modeling and simulation capabilities have lacked the detail, 
 10 
scale, and real-time capacity required to realistically train in a virtual simulated urban 
environment.  
Virtual and Constructive Simulation 
The DoD must therefore construct robust simulated environments that will allow 
military planners to effectively develop and test doctrine for joint urban operations 
(JUO).  Virtual and constructive simulations are defined, respectively, by DMSO as “… 
real people operating simulated systems,” and “… simulated people operating simulated 
systems.”  A third type of simulation, live simulation, involves “real people operating real 
systems.”  (DoD 5000.59-P, A-6:1998)  Unfortunately, operating military hardware 
within a real urban environment is problematic at best.  Nor are we likely to build a full-
scale model of a modern urban area complete with non-combatants going about their 
daily, simulated, lives.  We are therefore limited to training within a virtual and 
constructive world where key players can develop and practice tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) in a realistic simulated urban environment.   
A synthetic urban environment must include, at a minimum: a robust building set 
and terrain map, non-combatants acting in a culturally accurate manner, intelligent 
adversaries, vehicle traffic, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
assets (Dehncke, 2005).  These features, and more, must be implemented so that they 
operate in real-time and allow for human-in-the-loop (HITL) interaction.   
Creating a complex urban environment is not a simple task.  Only a few terrain 
maps exist with high levels of detail and even fewer building data sets exist that 
realistically reproduce the millions of structures that may be present in a modern urban 
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area.  Nor does merely representing buildings as solid objects suffice.  A key feature of 
the urban environment is the complexity created by the presence of structures that 
provide concealment and firing positions.  Structurally they must possess, multiple levels, 
allow for realistic structural damaged, fortification, etc.  Thus, it is desirable to represent 
a building as a fully interactive three-dimensional structure with openings that allow 
entry and exit of entities and projectiles, occupation of and travel between multiple 
levels, and realistic damage based on weapons effects (Miller, 2003). 
In addition to the buildings and terrain, a JUO training environment must include 
realistic simulation of non-combatant entities.  The requirement to minimize civilian 
casualties and the need to identify combatants concealing themselves within the 
population demands an accurate depiction of non-combatants.  These entities must 
behave in a culturally consistent manner performing daily activities on a realistic 
timetable (Dehncke, 2005).  However, modeling crowds of people goes beyond 
accurately simulating a single individual’s behavior under a given situation.  Accurately 
modeling a crowd requires allowances for different entities to have different motivations 
and behaviors when faced with the same situation.  A model that includes identically 
behaving entities will not appear realistic even if a single entity behaved in a realistic 
manner (Ulicny, 2001). 
Further complicating the problem for military simulation is the need to model 
enemy forces in the urban environment.  No longer is it a simple matter to simulate the 
behavior of an enemy combatant engaging in open combat using conventional warfare 
tactics.  Although urban operations can take the form of open combat with a clear enemy, 
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the more difficult task of defending against an insurgency or performing peacekeeping 
operations is becoming more prevalent as was demonstrated during operations in Kosovo, 
Mogadishu, and now Iraqi.  The challenge in such environments is to model the 
insurgents as they attempt to blend in while performing clandestine nefarious activities. 
Synthetic Environment and Semi-Automated Forces 
In the past, senior leaders were content to practice the art of war by participating 
in what could best be described as glorified games of Risk, controlling the movements of 
divisions, corps, and even entire armies as the battle progresses.  The need for senior 
leaders to train in large-scale, yet highly detailed, battle spaces has become a critical 
issue.  Senior leaders and strategists must have the ability to train for the more complex 
and intricate environments facing them today and in the future.  The explosion of ISR 
assets and the transformation to network centric warfare has provided unique 
opportunities but also unique challenges.  The ability to obtain vast quantities of data is 
an incredible achievement, however, data is not information, and information is not 
understanding.   
The ability to generate large-scale high-resolution synthetic environments is 
relatively new.  Although combat modeling state-of-the-art has been marching at a steady 
pace towards such a goal, it is only recently that all the pieces required have fallen into 
place.  Much of the credit can be assigned to the huge advances in computing power that 
have occurred in recent years.  However, just as important as the advances in technology 
have been, so has the evolution of the need for such environments.  
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URBAN RESOLVE 
In response to the DoD’s need for realistic urban training and improved tactics 
and systems, the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM) Joint Experimentation 
directorate (J9) sponsored the experiment URBAN RESOLVE in 2004.  URBAN 
RESOLVE is a three-phase effort, extending to 2007 and beyond, with the goal to, “… 
guide the development of critical warfighting capabilities for the future joint force 
commander, with a particular focus on those needed for effective urban operations,” 
(Urban, 2006).  The URBAN RESOLVE experiment takes place within a massive 
synthetic urban environment that consists of 1.8+ million building structures.  Of those 
structures, 65,000 of them allow for increased interaction such that entities can enter the 
buildings, fight inside, and see the street from within the building.  A key aspect of the 
synthetic environment in URBAN RESOLVE is the simulation of a dense urban 
population, called cultural features, that included over 124,000 entities with 
approximately 35,000 of them active and behaving in a culturally accurate manner.  
Testing has shown that over 1 million entities are possible.  Green Force participants 
controlled the cultural-features (Wielhouwer, 2005:12-13 and Rafuse, 2006). 
The first phase of URBAN RESOLVE, URBAN RESOLVE 2015, occurred 
between June and October 2004.  URBAN RESOLVE 2015’s goal was to assess the 
ability of the Joint Forces Commander to attain situational awareness utilizing a myriad 
of current and future ISR assets.  The Blue Forces’ mission was to employ ISR assets to 
detect and predict the movements and presence of Red Force entities as they moved about 
within the dense cultural features of the synthetic environment, and to stealthily deploy 
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and conceal their ISR assets.  Meanwhile the Red Forces’ mission was to challenge, 
adapt, and react to the Blue Force in a manner consistent with an aggressive and adaptive 
enemy (Wielhouwer, 2005:10-11).  The results from Phase 1 were impressive.  The Blue 
Force detected 80% of the Red Forces, identified 50%-60% of the Red Forces’ current 
activities, and anticipated 60%-70% of their future actions (Wielhouwer, 2005:14). 
The backbone technologies that made URBAN RESOLVE possible were the 
JSAF synthetic environment, the use of distributed Scalable Parallel Processors (SPP) 
clusters, the Defense Research Engineering Network (DREN), and the Command and 
Control (C2) workstations used for HITL warfighter involvement (Dehncke, 2005).  The 
JSAF environment was responsible for providing the synthetic environment in which the 
exercise occurred as well as the entity level Blue and Red Forces, and the Green team’s 
cultural features.  Modeling of the sensor data was performed by the Simulation of 
Location and Attack of Mobile Enemy Missiles (SLAMEM) federate.  Modeling of 
HUMINT data was provided by the SOAR-SOF federate.  The SPP clusters provided the 
raw processing power required for JSAF to generate the environment and entities.  The 
SPP clusters are located at the Maui High Performance Computer Center (MHPCC) in 
Maui, HI and the Aeronautical Systems Center Major Shared Resource Center (ASC-
MSRC) at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH.  Additional computing resources for 
Blue, Red, and Green Force operations, simulation control, and the analysis team were 
located at Ft Belvoir, VA, San Diego CA, and Suffolk, VA.  Linking all these distant 
resources together in real-time was the DREN as depicted in Figure 2 (Dehncke, 2005). 
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Figure 2.  Connectivity between distributed participants (Dehncke, 2005) 
 
The C2 systems for warfighter interaction consist of a JSAF display responsible 
for providing the shared tactical picture as perceived by the participants, a JSAF control 
terminal for sensor controls, data display assessment, track management, and a terminal 
for collaborative tools such a text, chat, voice and graphics (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Operator’s C2 Workstation (Dehncke, 2005) 
 
The process of generating a track in URBAN RESOLVE involves the generation 
and transmission of “ground truth” data for all entities (Blue, Red, and Green Forces).  As 
these entities move around the synthetic environment, they may enter the sensor footprint 
of an ISR entity.  At this point, the simulation decides if the entity is visible to the sensor 
based on various criteria such as line-of-site (LOS).  If the entity is detectable by the 
sensor, this triggers an “interaction” event.  The interaction event is then sent to a 
confusion matrix, in the SLAMEM federation, that adds a level of uncertainty to the 
interaction.  The confusion matrix uses data related to the sensors capabilities against the 
given target entity, environmental conditions, etc. and generates a track indicating the 
possible identity of the track and a confidence value.  The tracks are then displayed for 
the warfighters on their consoles.  As multiple sensor hits accumulate for a given track, a 
process within SLAMEM automatically correlates tracks to increase the confidence level 
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of the track’s label.  An example would be three tracks generated by three different 
sensors on a given moving target.  When considered separately, each of those tracks may 
have a low confidence that the target in question is a tank.  However when considered 
together, those three tracks may indicate, with a high level of confidence, that the track in 
question is a T-72 tank (Rafuse, 2006). 
As the warfighters observe the multitude of tracks on their consoles, they can 
make inferences as to the intent of the track(s).  These inferences are called situational 
awareness objects (SAO) that can be considered notional “buckets” that contain a track, 
or tracks.  An SAO indicates the operator’s guess as to the track’s intent and provides a 
mechanism for the operator to share this information with other players.  For example, a 
series of tracks labeled as vehicles, containing armed civilians, known insurgent leaders, 
and traveling together along the same route, may be labeled as an enemy convoy and 
placed in an SAO.  Analysis of these SAOs is what allowed the exercise evaluators to 
determine if the Blue Force was able to accurately determine and predict the activities of 
the Red Force (Rafuse, 2006). 
What should become apparent from the discussion thus far are the vast quantities 
of data such an exercise generates.  The dataset for a single twenty-four hour simulation 
trial, excluding all cultural-feature data, was approximately ninety to one hundred twenty 
gigabytes containing forty to fifty million rows of data.  The entire URBAN RESOLVE 
2015 Phase 1 exercise consisted of seven such trials.  The complete dataset, including all 
cultural-features, consumed over 3.5 terabytes of disk space.  This presents a significant 
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obstacle for data analysis and presents opportunities for new techniques in analysis and 
data mining. 
Collecting such a vast amount of data presented certain obstacles as well.  Early 
data collection schemas attempted to push all logged data to a central repository.  
However, as the exercise environment grew, the data transfer requirement overloaded the 
physical network and resulted in data loss.  In addition, it was not possible to log some 
simulation event data because of the way cluster computers operate.  To address these 
limitations URBAN RESOLVE Phase I utilized interceptor/logger applications operating 
at each computing cluster.  An aggregator application was used to request data of interest 
from the individual computing clusters (Graebener, 2004:2-3).  The result was a data 
collection schema that allowed robust collection without saturating the network and 
afforded the analysts near-real-time access to, and analysis of, the data.  The backbone of 
the database was the open source database engine MySQL.  The open source nature of 
MySQL allowed the analysts to modify the actual application to suit their needs. 
The initial intent of URBAN RESOLVE was as a tool to evaluate the ability of 
current and future ISR assets to aid the warfighter in gaining situational awareness in a 
modern urban setting.  The success of Phase 1 showed senior leaders the potential of 
applying URBAN RESOLVE’s experimental approach to problems faced in present day 
urban operations.  The result was an expansion of URBAN RESOLVE to establish a 
baseline of current urban warfare capabilities, and address current challenges faced by 
our forces.  The two new directives included adapting the modeling and simulation 
framework to support its use as a mission planning and rehearsal tool for deploying 
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forces, and supporting development of more effective responses to non-traditional mortar 
attacks in Iraq (Wielhouwer, 2005:11-12).  
Summary 
This literature review investigated the current scope of modeling and simulation 
in the DOD and the history of combat modeling.  The review then continued with a 
discussion of urban combat and the DoD’s need to better train and equip our forces to 
operate in the urban environment.  This led to an examination of computer generated 
synthetic environments, semi-automated forces, and ultimately the URBAN RESOLVE 
exercise.  Finally, this literature review showed that data collection, reduction and 
analysis is a significant challenge to such a large-scale event. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodology 
employed for the URBAN RESOLVE exercise and the methods used in this research 
effort to analyze the data generated from the exercise.  It begins with a discussion of 
URBAN RESOLVE’s experimental architecture, experimental design, data collection 
methods, and data analysis.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of 
the available data, a nonparametric method for generating confidence intervals for the 
median of single-population data, and finally a description of the analysis performed. 
Experiment Architecture 
 As previously discussed, URBAN RESOLVE Phase I was an exercise 
intended to investigate the utility of new and emerging ISR technologies, and the TTPs 
used to employ them, in a large-scale HITL synthetic urban environment.  The URBAN 
RESOLVE exercise took place in the simulated Indonesian capital city of Jakarta.  The 
Red Forces withdrew into the city to mount a final defense and possess medium-range 
ballistic missiles (MRBM).  The Blue Force Joint Intelligence and Fusion Cell (Blue 
Cell) controlled an array of sensor platforms that included unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV), organic aerial vehicles (OAV), and unmanned ground sensors (UGS).  The Blue 
Cell controlled these platforms to gain situational awareness of the enemy’s activities.  
The UAVs operated at medium/high altitude, provided a “persistent” stare into the area of 
interest (AOI), and were responsible for initiating and maintaining tracks of Red entities.  
The OAVs operated a low altitude were ale to flow down into the AOI and provided a 
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closer look to locate, track, and identify Red entities.  The OAVs were also capable of 
placing radio frequency tags onto vehicles and personnel.  The UGSs assisted the Blue 
cell in locating, tracking, and identifying Red entities, and in some cases tagging entities 
(Burke, 2005:9).  A broad range of sensors were available, and included acoustic/seismic, 
magnetometer, Ku-band moving target indicator (MTI), Ku-band synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR), foliage penetrating SAR, LADAR, Laser Profilers, Electro-optical/Infra-red 
(EO/IR), and X-ray sensors.  In addition, special operations forces (SOF) and HUMINT 
were available (Burke, 2005:24-30).  Tracks within URBAN RESOLVE were generated 
using the following process: 
• A sensor foot print was projected onto the AOI 
• If an entity fell within that foot print it was tested for LOS, velocity, and 
concealment 
• If the entity was deemed “visible” to the sensor the following occurred: 
o A random draw was made and compared against the probability of 
detection for the sensor-target pairing to determine if the sensor 
actually detects a target 
o If a detection occurred the entity was processed through a 
confusion matrix to determine how the target is classified 
o The track was then either passed to the Blue Cell, updated if the 
track already existed, or used to cue another sensor-platform pair 
 
Target correlation was modeled perfectly such that two or more sensors that 
detected the same target resulted in a single track.  Similarly, two targets were never 
classified as the same target if they were in close proximity (Burke, 2005:31-32). 
 22 
Experiment Design 
URBAN RESOLVE Phase I exercise encompassed seven different scenarios.  
The exercise variables were Blue Force platforms inventory, target signature, Red Force 
activity level, and availability of Tags.  The complete exercise design is shown in Table 
1.  The parameter “reduced Blue platform inventory” meant the removal of all UAVs 
with hyperspectral and EO/IR sensors from the simulation.  The remaining platforms 
were the UAVs with SAR sensors.  The intent of the reduction was to simulate a low 
cloud ceiling.  The parameter for “Red Force signature reduction” simulated attempts by 
the Red Force to reduce or alter their signature return.  The reduced signature effect was 
modeled in the simulation by modifying the detection and identification capabilities of 
Blue Force sensors relative to those targets.  Red Force activity level (active/inactive) 
indicates the proportion of the force that began the event outside the AOI.  An active Red 
Force started the event with 70% of its forces outside the AOI while an inactive force 
started with 70% of forces already inside the AOI.  The presence of Tags in the exercise 
was varied by allowing or disallowing their use (Burke, 2005:ES7-ES9).  Tags are small 
radio frequency ID (RFID) tags that are attached to enemy personnel and equipment by 
either OAVs or UGSs.  Blue Force sensors can track the Tags and provide an effective 
method for maintaining situational awareness of a track’s position and identity even if the 
track is lost for extended periods within the urban clutter. 
An inspection of Table 1 reveals a flaw in the experimental design.  In each trial, 
more than a single parameter is changed.  Designing trials with a multiple parameter 
changes makes it difficult to correlate observed changes in the data to changes in a 
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particular parameter.  A compounding factor to the poor experimental design is the lack 
of multiple replicate runs for each trial.  This is expected from an exercise of this type 
due to the large amount of time and resources required to perform a single replication.  
With only single replications, that are not independent, classical statistical comparative 
analysis is not possible. 
   
Table 1.  Exercise Design (Burke, 2005:16-17) 
Trial 1 
• Full blue platform inventory 
• Full target signature 
• Active Red 
• 48-hour trial 
• Tags 
Trial 2A Trial 2B 
• Full Blue platform inventory 
• Full targets signature  
• Inactive Red 
• Tags 
• 24-hour trial 
• Reduced Blue platform inventory 
• Full target signature 
• Inactive Red 
• Tags 
• 18-hour trial 
Trial 3A Trial 3B 
• Full Blue platform inventory 
• Reduced target signature  
• Active Red 
• Tags 
• 24-hour trial 
• Reduced Blue platform inventory 
• Full target signature 
• Active Red 
• Tags 
• 24-hour trial 
Trial 4A Trial 4B 
• Full Blue platform inventory 
• Full target signature  
• Active Red 
• No Tags 
• 24-hour trial 
• Reduced Blue platform inventory 
• Reduced target signature 
• Active Red 
• No Tags 
• 24-hour trial 
 
Data Collection and Reduction 
 Data collection in URBAN RESOLVE was a monumental task.  In any 
given event, the constellation of Blue Force platforms numbered between 115 and 330, 
many of which had multiple sensors.  The constellation was reporting detections on over 
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1100 Red Force entities dispersed within a population of over 100,000 cultural features 
(Burke, 2005:77-80).  Each event run generated approximately 40-50 million rows of 
data and consumed 90-120 gigabytes of physical storage space (Rafuse, 2006).  Table 2 
shows an example of one of the many tables available.  This particular table shows the 
data generated from a single contact report when a sensor detects an entity. 
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Table 2.  Raw MySQL data table from URBAN RESOLVE Phase I (2005) 
Field DataType Description 
uniqueIndex STRING Unique ID for record within individual logger database 
node STRING Node hostname 
spaceName INTEGER RTI Namespace Name 
timestamp FLOAT Local machine timestamp for record (when written) 
platform_id_ID STRING Identifies the platform this sensor is mounted on. 
sensor_id INTEGER Sensor ID on this platform 
sensor_plan_mode INTEGER Internal ID of sensor/mode/exploitation combination 
batch_flag INTEGER Internal use (beg/middle/end of collections) 
FOPEN_depth FLOAT Two-way detection threshold (meters) 
owning_force STRING Force of entity object (Friendly/Opposing/Neutral) 
platform_type_EntityKind INTEGER Enumeration value for entity object - Kind 
platform_type_Domain INTEGER Enumeration value for entity object - Domain 
platform_type_CountryCode INTEGER Enumeration value for entity object - Country 
platform_type_Category INTEGER Enumeration value for entity object - Category 
platform_type_Subcategory INTEGER Enumeration value for entity object - SubCategory 
platform_type_Specific INTEGER Enumeration value for entity object - Specific 
platform_type_Extra INTEGER Enumeration value for entity object - Extra 
sensor_location_X DOUBLE GCS Location of entity object - X Value 
sensor_location_Y DOUBLE GCS Location of entity object - Y Value 
sensor_location_Z DOUBLE GCS Location of munition object - Z Value 
platform_velocity_Xvelocity FLOAT Movement velocity of entity object - X Value 
platform_velocity_Yvelocity FLOAT Movement velocity of entity object - Y Value 
platform_velocity_Zvelocity FLOAT Movement velocity of entity object - Z Value 
sensor_mode STRING Mode of operation for sensor (MTI, STRIP_EO, etc.) 
comment STRING The comment to attach. 
entity_id_ID INTEGER Ground truth id of the entity that got painted. 
location_X DOUBLE Ground truth GCS Location of entity object - X Value 
location_Y DOUBLE Ground truth GCS Location of entity object - Y Value 
location_Z DOUBLE Ground truth GCS Location of entity object - Z Value 
velocity_XVelocity FLOAT Movement velocity of entity object - X Value 
velocity_YVelocity FLOAT Movement velocity of entity object - Y Value 
velocity_ZVelocity FLOAT Movement velocity of entity object - Z Value 
appearance INTEGER Appearance bits of the painted vehicle. 
building_attributes INTEGER Attribute bits of the painted building. 
detection_status STRING Enum'd result of the filters, indicating if the vehicle id detectable or not. 
detected_type_EntityKind INTEGER Enumeration value for the true guise - Kind 
detected_type_Domain INTEGER Enumeration value for the true guise - Domain 
detected_type_CountryCode INTEGER Enumeration value for the true guise - Country 
detected_type_Category INTEGER Enumeration value for the true guise - Category 
detected_type_Subcategory INTEGER Enumeration value for the true guise - SubCategory 
detected_type_Specific INTEGER Enumeration value for the true guise - Specific 
detected_type_Extra INTEGER Enumeration value for the true guise - Extra 
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Obtaining the URBAN RESOLVE data presented some significant challenges for 
this research effort.  Due to the size of the dataset, we were not able to request the entire 
dataset on a portable media format such as a DVD or CD.  Initially we tried to work with 
a very small subset of the data received on DVD.  However, due to database software 
differences, a significant amount of time was expended to make the data usable with only 
partial success.  Even then, we quickly realized that the subset of data was not sufficient 
to perform any meaningful analysis.  The dataset contained only a four-hour block of 
time from a single trial.  Eventually we were able to gain direct access to the entire 
dataset via the J9 servers housing the data.  
Post analysis data reduction of such large quantities of data presented similar 
challenges.  As with data collection, early data analysis techniques proved problematic as 
the datasets grew in size.  However, the URBAN RESOLVE analysts were able to use 
another open source tool called PHP (recursive acronym for PHP: Hypertext Protocol) to 
extract the specific data required to answer the exercise’s measures of performance 
(MOP) (PHP, 2006).  Table 3 shows a small portion of the data that was aggregated from 
the raw dataset.  The entire table contains 28,815 rows.  Of particular interest to this 
research are the “initial detection time”, “initial identification time”, “target type”, and 
“track originating platform.”  The exercise planners wished to answer three top-level 
questions: 
1) To what extent can situational awareness be developed during JUO? 
2) How effectively are sensor data used to detect and correlate targets? 
3) What conditions affect Blue capabilities? 
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Table 3.  Track Data table URBAN RESOLVE Phase I Trial 1 (2005) 
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This research most directly relates to question three.  Each question had a set of 
MOPs associated with it that are meant to help answer these top-level questions.  
Similarly, each MOP had approximately twelve measures that were used to evaluate the 
MOP.  Table 4 provides an example of the types of MOPs and measures used in URBAN 
RESOLVE.  Appendix A contains the entire set of MOPs and measures. 
 
Table 4.  Example of URBAN RESOLVE MOP and Associated Measures 
Q1.  To what extent can SA/SU be developed in JUO 
M1.2 Number of Critical Weapon Nodes Identified 
a Terminal points of Red vehicle paths  (see M1.1) 
b Terminal points of Red DI paths (see M1.1) 
c Acquisitions of Red weapon systems (characteristics) 
d Acquisitions of Red weapon systems (location) 
e Acquisitions of Red WMD systems (characteristics) 
f Acquisitions of Red WMD systems (location) 
 
Data Analysis 
The analysis performed in this research will focus on two areas: the time to 
identify (TTI) a target once it has been detected and the rate at which identifications are 
generated versus time.  Each area will be evaluated for patterns or trends between trials, 
target groups, and detecting sensor type.  As mentioned previously the level of effort and 
resources required to perform a given URBAN RESOLVE event meant that only a single 
replication was performed for each exercise design trial.  Analysis of single replication 
data presents several difficulties for an analyst.  The assumption that the trials are 
independent or identical cannot be made because exercise participants remained the same 
for all trials.  Ordinarily this may not present a problem, however a definite learning 
curve was observed in relation to the proficiency of the players.  As the exercise 
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progressed, the Blue and Red force operators became more efficient at using the 
simulation hardware as well as more adept at playing the game.  The result was the 
exclusion of Trial 1 from the original analysis and the loss of the intended “base case.”  
In addition to the unintentional “learning” that was observed, exercise participants on 
both sides intentionally varied their tactics.  Specifically the Blue force was responsible 
for positioning their available ISR assets before the start of each trial.  The Red force was 
also encouraged to vary their tactics to keep the element of surprise (Burke, 2005:66).  
Assuming that the distributions of the TTIs for each design case are the same may or may 
not be reasonable.  However, given the similar process that generated them, we assume 
they are close enough for our purposes.  The distributions are not normal and the central 
limit theorem cannot be used because we lack identical and independent replications for 
each design trial (Wackerly, 2002:346-348).  The distribution variances cannot be 
assumed the same either.   
Although many assumptions about the data cannot be made, nonparametric 
statistics may still be used to perform statistical analysis (Wackerly, 2002:708-709).  
Many nonparametric statistics only require that the data be continuous and random 
(Neter, 1988:481).  Unfortunately, in order to perform any form of hypothesis testing still 
requires independence.  A nonparametric confidence interval for the population median 
can be determined for a large-sample (n >15) single-population using the following 
method; all data in this analysis contained at least 15 data-points.  For a desired 1 - α 
confidence coefficient for confidence interval Lr ≤ η ≤ Ur such that Lr and Ur are the r
th 
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smallest and largest samples respectively.  The variable r is the largest integer that does 
not exceed the value of equation (1) (Neter, 1988:485).  
 r = 0.5[n + 1 - z(1 - α/2)√n] (1) 
A large majority of the TTI values are zero because many target identifications 
are generated by the same sensor that initially detected them.  Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to use the median TTI rather than the mean TTI.  The median is the middle of 
a distribution such that half of all values are above and below it.  This makes the median 
much less susceptible to extreme values than the mean and thus more appropriate for this 
study. 
Summary 
This chapter introduced the general experimental architecture and design of 
URBAN RESOLVE Phase I and pointed out the limitations of an experimental design 
where more than a single parameter is varied in each trial.  Next, it discussed data 
collection, data reduction, and the difficulties of working with such a large and expanding 
dataset.  Next, this chapter discussed the limitations of working with single-replication 
datasets that preclude typical parametric statistical methods of analysis.  Finally, this 
chapter discussed a nonparametric method to generate confidence intervals for the 
median value of that data.  
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter details the data analysis performed on the data from URBAN 
RESOLVE Phase I for this research.  Where applicable the analysis involves not only the 
complete dataset for a given trial, but also decomposition by target-type and the track-
originating sensor.   
Data Analysis 
URBAN RESOLVE Phase I consisted of seven different trials of which six 
datasets were obtained (Trial 3b was missing).  Within each trial folder there was a file 
containing the complete list of Red Force tracks generated during a run.  Each record 
included the platform, sensor, and time for track detection and, when available, track 
identification.  Track identification data was not available if the track was not identified.  
This analysis focuses its efforts only on tracks that were identified.  The data was 
manipulated using Microsoft Excel to sort the tracks by identifying time and the TTI was 
calculated from the difference between the track identifying and originating times.  The 
tracks were sorted again based on TTI and the process was repeated for the remaining 
trial datasets.   
Initially we considered the mean TTI for all tracks.  However, the data included a 
significant number of zero data points which skewed the data (i.e. eighty-nine percent of 
all tracks in Trial 4b possessed a TTI of zero).  A TTI = 0 meant the track was identified 
immediately by the detecting sensor and is termed an “Instant-ID.”  In an effort to 
minimize the effects of these extreme data points, the median TTI was used.  Use of the 
 32 
median statistic helps reduce the effect of extreme values.  The median is the middle data 
point such that there are an equal number of data points above and below the median 
value.  However, once the zeros were removed the median TTIs all dropped to 0.0 
minutes (Table 5). 
 
Table 5.  All Target Types, All IDs 
 Trial Total Detections Total IDs Median TTI Mean TTI Max TTI Instant-ID 
1 28517 10236 0.0 5.9 8398.0 54% 
2a 13847 3352 0.0 5.0 4997.0 63% 
2b 7902 3130 0.0 2.2 4140.0 66% 
3a 8159 3501 0.0 12.9 1425.0 56% 
4a 13385 3888 0.0 2.4 5595.0 84% A
ll 
T
ar
ge
ts
 
4b 11098 4369 0.0 2.1 5394.0 89% 
 
As a next step in the analysis, the tracks were broken down by target in the hope 
that some information related to the TTI for different targets may be found within and 
between the trials.  For the purpose of this analysis, and to remain consistent with 
previous analysis, target types were grouped into eight target groups as shown in Table 6.  
The target groups categorize the targets such that similar or related targets can be viewed 
together.   
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Table 6.  Target Groups 
Target Group Target Types 
Artillery 
120mm Mortar 
105mm Howitzer 
Air Defense 
AAA 
AD Command Vehicle 
Quad SA18 
SA-11 
SA-15 
SA-15 Decoy 
ZU-23 
Snow Drift Radar 
Mechanized 
BMP-3 
T-90 
T-90 Decoy 
TEL, WMD, MTT 
BTR-80 
MAZ6430 Truck 
SS26 Command Vehicle 
SS26 TEL 
SS26 TEL Decoy 
SS26 TEL Reload Vehicle 
Leaders Leaders 
Armed Civilians Armed Civilians 
Soldiers Soldiers 
Others 
Civilian UNIMOG Truck 
Military UNIMOG Truck 
Large Truck 
Medium Truck 
URAL Truck 
Small Car  
Motorcyclist 
SUV 
SUV Command Vehicle 
Technical 
ZIL-157 Cargo Truck 
 
Now that the data was separated by target group, two target groups did possess 
median TTIs greater than zero.  These target groups were the Armed Civilians (Table 7) 
and Mechanized target groups (Table 8).  Within these two target groups only Trials 1, 
2b, and Trial 3a, possess non-zero median TTIs.  The data for the other target groups may 
be found in Appendix B.   
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Table 7.  Armed Civilians, All IDs 
 Trial Total Detections Total IDs Lr Median TTI Ur Max TTI Instant-ID 
1 1729 197 9.0 12.8 15.7 317.5 21% 
2a 1563 215 2.7 3.4 4.0 95.2 50% 
2b 414 42 0.0 0.0 2.9 157.9 57% 
3a 3465 702 0.0 0.0 0.2 653.8 52% 
4a 4959 609 0.0 0.0 0.0 171.8 75% 
A
rm
ed
 C
iv
ili
an
s 
4b 3689 624 0.0 0.0 0.0 259.9 86% 
 
Table 8.  Mechanized Targets, All IDs 
 Trial Total Detections Total IDs Lr Median TTI Ur Max TTI Instant-ID 
1 3148 1802 0.0 0.0 0.0 333.8 69% 
2a 3618 462 0.0 0.0 0.0 1081.6 73% 
2b 490 192 0.0 0.0 1.8 149.8 55% 
3a 279 141 1.4 3.9 7.7 303.9 35% 
4a 518 256 0.0 0.0 0.0 249.6 77% M
ec
ha
ni
ze
d 
4b 371 200 0.0 0.0 0.5 303.6 58% 
 
Although there are three instances, where the median TTI was greater than zero, 
no confidence level can be associated with those estimates.  Using the single-sample 
confidence interval discussed in Chapter 3, 95% confidence intervals for the median TTI 
were calculated for the Mechanized and Armed Civilian target groups.  The results are 
shown in Table 7 and Table 8.  The column labeled ‘r” shows the values calculated using 
equation (1) while the columns labeled Lr and Ur show the lower and upper bounds of the 
median TTI at the 95% confidence level.  Here we see that the only trial with a lower 
bound not equal to zero is Trial 3a.  We can conclude with 95% confidence that the 
median TTI for Trial 3a is non-zero.  However, a comparison with the other trials is not 
truly possible because of the lack of independence.  Not surprisingly, Trial 3a possessed 
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the fewest identifications with TTI = 0 as evidenced by the 35% Instant-IDs.  Trial 3a is 
also the trial with the fewest total IDs.   
As discussed earlier, the experimental design allowed variation of multiple 
parameters between each trial.  As such, it is difficult to make any conclusions about the 
cause of the non-zero median TTI for Trial 3a relative to the other trials.  It is tempting to 
look at Trial 3a’s reduced target signature parameter and conclude that was the cause for 
the non-zero TTI and even the lower number of Total IDs.  However, Trial 4b had both a 
reduced signature parameter and a reduced sensor inventory parameter, yet still possessed 
a median TTI lower bound of 0.0 minutes.  Similarly, comparisons between Trial 3a and 
4a are tempting but the absence of Tags makes it difficult, coupled with Trial 4a’s 0.0 
minutes median TTI upper bound. 
Next, we focused on data points where TTI was greater than zero.  These tracks 
required an additional sensor detection before the target could be identified with 
confidence.  The need for this “second-look” was the result of conditions within the 
synthetic environment that prevented the sensor from identifying the target with a high 
degree of confidence.  Another cause for second-look identifications were sensors 
specifically indented to cue another sensor without producing a track on the operator’s 
Shared Tactical Picture display.  Analysis of tracks with TTI > 0 was performed on the 
Armed Civilians and Mechanized target groups.  The resulting data can be found in Table 
9 and Table 10 respectively.   
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Table 9.  Armed Civilians, TTI > 0 
 Trial Total IDs Min TTI Lr Median TTI Ur Max TTI 
1 155 0.1 14.8 17.4 22.7 317.5 
2a 107 0.1 2.1 2.3 2.9 95.2 
2b 18 2.1 4.0 11.7 21.7 157.9 
3a 339 0.1 6.2 8.6 13.6 653.8 
4a 150 0.5 3.4 3.9 5.1 171.8 
A
rm
ed
 C
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s 
4b 89 0.1 1.7 2.6 4.4 259.9 
 
Table 10.  Mechanized Targets, TTI > 0 
 Trial Total IDs Min TTI Lr Median TTI Ur Max TTI 
1 562 0.1 12.1 14.1 15.5 333.8 
2a 124 0.5 8.5 16.7 31.0 1081.6 
2b 87 0.7 9.2 11.7 14.9 149.8 
3a 92 0.1 8.0 10.9 15.2 303.9 
4a 62 1.6 17.6 24.6 41.2 249.6 M
ec
ha
ni
ze
d 
4b 88 0.3 10.8 15.4 19.8 303.6 
 
Figure 4 shows the median TTI along with the 95% upper and lower confidence 
intervals for the Armed Civilian target group.  As Figure 4 shows, the only trial that does 
not overlap with the majority of the others is Trial 1.  Given what we know about the 
learning curve experiences in the exercise this comes as no surprise.  Although Trial 2a 
overlaps with Trials 2b, 4a, and 4b, it does have the tightest confidence interval.  This is 
an interesting result as it is also only the second trial that occurred where there may have 
still be some learning occurring.  Compared with the other trials, 2a is also the only trial 
with full inventory and signatures but an inactive force.  Recall that the inactive force 
parameter means 70% of the enemy targets begin the simulation already within the AOI.  
Further analysis would be required to determine any causal effect between enemy forces 
that are already inside the AOI vs. ones that could be observed traveling into the AOI.  
 37 
Trial 3a can be seen outside the ranges of trials 2a, 4a, and 4b and may be an area for 
further study.  Trials 4a and 4b do not appear to be significantly different.  This result is 
curious since when you recall that Trial 4a used the full inventory and full signature 
design variables while Trial 4b used the reduced level for both parameters.  The 
expectation here would be for there to be a noticeable difference in the ability of the Blue 
force to find and identify targets.  The extremely wide range for Trial 2b may be due to 
the very low count (18) compared to the other trials. 
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Figure 4.  Median TTI and 95% Confidence Interval for Armed Civilian Targets 
 
Figure 5 shows the median TTI along with the 95% upper and lower confidence 
intervals for the Mechanized target group.  The lower bound for Trial 4a is higher than 
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the upper bounds of Trials 1, 2b, and 3a, but not Trials 2a and 4b.  Unlike with the Armed 
Civilians, the confidence intervals for Trials 4a and 4b are close to not overlapping.  As 
mentioned earlier, differences between these two trials are expected.  However, the result 
is even more curious than before because the median TTI for Trial 4a is actually longer 
than for Trial 4b.  The normal expectation would be for this trend to be reversed.  Finally 
comparing the Armed Civilians and the Mechanized targets, we see that the relative size 
of the confidence intervals is inverted such that trials with the larger intervals in Table 9 
possess the relatively smaller intervals in Table 10 and visa versa.  Although there is no 
apparent explanation for the result, it begs the question why. 
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Figure 5.  Median TTI and 95% Confidence Interval for Mechanized Targets 
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Next, we looked at the tracks based on the initial detecting platform (UAV and 
OAV) and the corresponding TTI.  The UGSs were not included because they 
represented a very small proportion of the total track detections (~2%).  Table 11 shows 
the total number of IDs produced by both platforms, the total number of IDs with TTI > 
0, the median TTI for all non-zero TTIs and their 95% confidence intervals.  The first 
item of interest is the All IDs count.  The OAVs produced significantly more IDs than the 
UAVs.  This is not a surprising result considering there were approximately five times as 
many OAVs in each trial as there were UAVs, however the OAV’s All IDs counts are not 
consistently five time larger than the UAVs.  When looking only at the IDs where TTI is 
greater than zero, the OAVs in Trial 1 are the only significant outliers from the rest of the 
OAV.  The fact that Trial 1 has such a tight confidence interval and lower median TTI is 
notable given the learning that is supposed to have occurred during Trial 1 as well as the 
large track count which would normally result in a wider spread of values.  Further 
analysis may explain why detections generated by the OAVs in Trial 1 required so little 
time to identify in comparison to the other trial.  Unfortunately, not much else can be said 
about the data.  The UAV TTI confidence intervals all overlap with both each other and 
their corresponding OAV values. 
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Table 11.  TTI Data for UAVs and OAVs  
 UAV OAV 
 All IDs Tracks with TTI > 0 All IDs Tracks with TTI > 0 
Trial Count Count r Lr 
Median 
TTI Ur Count Count r Lr 
Median 
TTI Ur 
1 2715 1002 470 4.4 5.1 5.7 6243 3040 1466 3.5 3.9 4.3 
2a 761 76 29 1.4 1.7 2.1 2410 1044 490 7.8 8.0 8.2 
2b 39 16 4 1.3 2.2 15.5 2563 651 300 6.0 6.6 7.9 
3a 555 24 7 2.3 4.5 16.6 2480 1155 544 4.8 5.7 6.2 
4a 838 14 3 0.5 3.2 23.6 2814 520 238 6.6 8.1 9.7 
4b 897 50 18 2.3 11.3 16.0 3108 343 153 8.0 9.6 11.2 
 
A final attempt to extract useful information from the data focused on the how 
fast IDs were generated in each trial for the Armed Civilians and Mechanized Targets; all 
ISR platforms were included.  Two charts were generated for each target group, an 
accumulated ID count, and a proportion of the total ID count.  Figure 6 and Figure 7 
show the data for the Armed Civilians and Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the data for the 
Mechanized targets.  Note that in Figure 8 the chart stops at 24 hours in order to better 
illustrate the differences between the trials.  Figure 6 shows a few interesting features.  
Trial 3a accumulated identified targets significantly faster than all other trials.  Again, 
because of the experimental design it is difficult to determine an exact cause with another 
trial to compare to with only single parameters being changed.  However, it is interesting 
to note that Trial 3a does have the reduced signature parameter yet still generated more 
targets, faster than all other trials.  Similarly, Trials 1 and 2b showed that significantly 
fewer tracks were accumulated at a slower rate.  Although difficult to pinpoint the cause, 
Trial 1 makes sense due to learning, and Trial 2b because of the reduced sensor 
inventory, inactive force, and only 18 hours worth of data.  Even if Trial 2b had 
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continued for another 6 hours, the slope of the curve indicates it is unlikely to have 
caught up to 3a, 4a, or 4b.  A very interesting result is the apparent similarity between 
Trials 4a and 4b.  The two parameters that are varied between these trials (inventory and 
signature) lead to the natural assumption that Trial 4b should accumulate fewer tracks at a 
slower rate.  Further analysis may be warranted to determine why this is occurring.   
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Figure 6.  Accumulated IDs vs. Time for Armed Civilians 
 
The proportional accumulation of Armed Civilians shown in Figure 7 shows an 
interesting trend for Trial 1 where it appears that the IDs accumulate very slowly at first 
then accelerates at an increasing rate after the first 24-hours.  Note that because of the 48-
hour run time of Trial 1 it has been displayed in two 24-hour segments.  The first segment 
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clearly shows a slower accumulation of identifications with a sudden increase in the 23rd 
hour.  The second segment of Trial 1 is on par with the other trials.  This behavior is 
likely indicative of the learning discussed in the original URBAN RESOLVE analysis.  
All of the other trials appear to accumulate their IDs at a similar and linear rate.  
Additional replications would be required before additional insight could be gained 
concerning the shape of the curves.  Trial 2b was removed because of its 18-hour 
timeframe. 
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Figure 7.  Proportion of Total Accumulated IDs vs. Time for Armed Civilians 
 
Figure 8 shows a rather different story from Figure 6.  Here Trial 1 accumulates 
many more Mechanized target IDs at a much faster rate and Trial 3a accumulates the 
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fewest IDs at the slowest rate.  Trials 4a and 4b now show a slight difference in both 
accumulation total and rate; however, it is only a slight difference especially considering 
the inventory and signature difference between them and compared to Trials 1 and 2a.  
Trial 2b managed to accumulate IDs at a comparable rate to Trials 4a and 4b, and the data 
at least suggests that it would have accumulated a similar number of IDs had it continued 
for the full 24 hours.  Finally, Trial 2b compares more similarly with the other trials and 
shows a marked difference compared to the Armed Civilians where it accumulated 
identifications on par with Trial 1 and much slower than the other trials. 
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Figure 8.  Accumulated IDs vs. Time for Mechanized Targets 
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Finally, Figure 9 shows the proportional accumulation of Mechanized IDs.  
Again, the curve for Trial 2b has been removed because of its 18-hour timeframe.  As 
before, Trial 1 has been split into two 24-hour sections.  The fist 24 hours shows a 
slightly slower accumulation compared to the other trials but not nearly to the extent as 
with the Armed Civilians.  The second segment of Trial 1 shows an accumulation that is 
significantly steeper than the other trials especially compared to the second segment of 
Trial 1 for the Armed Civilians.  Although there is not a significant difference between 
the trials of the Mechanized IDs, the difference between the two target groups is 
interesting. 
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Figure 9.  Proportion of Total Accumulated IDs vs. Time for Mechanized Targets 
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Summary 
This chapter detailed various attempts to distill useful information from the vast 
data set created in the URBAN RESOLVE exercise despite significant limitations due to 
the experimental design and lack of replications.  Non-parametric statistical techniques 
were used to calculate 95% confidence intervals for the median TTI for all target types 
and for each target group.  Analysis of all Armed Civilian and Mechanized target group 
IDs showed that Trials 2a and 3a had non-zero TTIs with 95% confidence.  Analysis of 
only the identifications requiring a second-look (TTI  > 0) showed some interesting, 
though inconclusive, trends that run counter to what would be anticipated.  This chapter 
also discussed the analysis of TTI data relative to the initial detecting platform (UAV vs. 
OAV).  Finally, this chapter discussed the analysis of the accumulation rate of 
identification versus time for the Armed Civilian and Mechanized target groups.  Some 
interesting trends were noted which may indicate possible areas for deeper analysis.
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V.  Conclusions 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter will provide a summary discussion of this research effort.  First, it 
will discuss the results of the analysis performed during this research effort.  Next will be 
a brief discussion of the obstacles encountered during the course of this research.  Finally, 
it will suggest areas for further research in this topic area. 
Analysis Results 
This research identified two notable trends in the URBAN RESOLVE data.  First, 
despite the “learning” that took place during Trial 1, the TTI for all target types was zero 
minutes for all of the trials.  When looking at individual target groups, the Armed 
Civilians were the only target group with a Trial 1 TTI that stood out as different from 
the other target groups.  When examining only the IDs with TTI > 0, the Armed Civilians 
in Trial 1 seemed to possess a noticeably longer TTI.  This result is to be expected given 
the “learning” that was supposed to have taken place.  However, when examining the 
TTIs for the Mechanized target group, Trial 1 was reasonably similar compared to the 
other trials.  Finally, analysis of the accumulated IDs versus time showed a similar result 
where fewer Armed Civilians were identified at a slower pace in Trial 1 compared to the 
other trials.  On the other hand, the exact opposite was true for the Mechanized target 
group where many more targets were identified at a much faster rate than the other trials. 
Second, although it is difficult to make causal comparisons relative to the design 
parameters and results, Trials 4a and 4b provide the best chance to observe the difference 
between what can be considered the best case scenario (full inventory / full signature) and 
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worst case scenario (reduced inventory / reduced signature) with no other differences in 
design.  However, what was observed most often was at best a complete lack of 
differentiation between the two trials, and at worst, results that appeared completely 
counter intuitive to the expected results.  The initial URBAN RESOLVE report noted that 
Trials 4a and 4b helped demonstrate the importance of Tags when compared to the other 
trials.   
The two trends mentioned above raise questions that bare further study: 
• Why are the Armed Civilians noticeably different from the other target 
groups?  
 
• Why does the Mechanized target group exhibit different behavior from the 
Armed Civilians? 
 
• Why are the results from Trials 4a and 4b so similar in some cases and 
counter-intuitive in others? 
Obstacles 
During the initial phases of this research, the intent was to investigate possible 
applications of JSAF in simulating the Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) and 
possible applications related to modeling of the time sensitive targeting (TST) kill-chain.  
The goal was to generate an appropriate environment and scenario in JSAF and to use 
that environment to investigate the ability to simulate the Combat Operations TCT cell of 
an AOC.  However, it became apparent that such an effort was too large an undertaking 
for the time and resources available.   
As research progressed, and the existence of JSAF’s use by other agencies 
became known, the hope was to build on their research and possibly modify their 
scenarios.  Attempts were made to acquire some portion of the URBAN RESOLVE 
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scenario in the hope that it could be used to perform simulations locally.  However, even 
that proved impossible.  A JSAF scenario cannot be easily broken down into pieces for 
independent use.  The very strengths of JSAF that make it such a powerful tool, its ability 
to operate in real-time with HITL participants and a large numbers of autonomous 
entities generated through multiple distributed computing clusters, makes its utility trivial 
when operated on a single workstation.  A project that seemed ambitious at first quickly 
became impossible as time marched on. 
Ultimately, the scope and scale of the URBAN RESOLVE exercise presented a 
possible foothold for research.  The sheer size of the dataset promised to be a treasure 
trove for analysis, however very size of the dataset made it difficult to obtain.  After 
nearly five weeks of unsuccessful attempts to acquire and convert a four-hour portion of 
data (8GB), we were finally able to access the entire dataset housed on the J9 servers via 
the DREN. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Several avenues for further research readily present themselves in relation to past 
and future incarnations of URBAN RESOLVE.  Analysis to answer the questions raised 
in this research may help improve the design of future URBAN RESOLVE events.  
Additional research using more sophisticated data mining techniques may illuminate 
additional trends in the data that have not yet been discovered.  Another area for future 
research is the development of pattern recognition tools to cue operators towards possible 
activity of interest based on track identity, behavior, and proximity to other tracks.  
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Finally, multiple replications of the trials, using different groups of operators, may 
provide a deeper analysis and expose unseen trends.
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Appendix A.  Analysis Questions and Measures of Performance 
 
Q1.  To what extent can SA/SU be developed in JUO 
M1.1 Number of Critical Command Nodes Identified 
a Terminal points of Red vehicle paths   
b Terminal points of Red DI paths 
c Red Vehicle congregation points 
d Red DI congregation points 
e Buildings housing several (> n) Red vehicles 
f Buildings housing many (> n) Red DI 
g Number of RF transmissions from individual bldgs 
h Number of RF transmissions from specific locations 
M1.2 Number of Critical Weapon Nodes Identified 
a Terminal points of Red vehicle paths  (see M1.1) 
b Terminal points of Red DI paths (see M1.1) 
c Acquisitions of Red weapon systems (characteristics) 
d Acquisitions of Red weapon systems (location) 
e Acquisitions of Red WMD systems (characteristics) 
f Acquisitions of Red WMD systems (location) 
M1.3 Number of Other Critical Nodes (or patterns) Identified 
a Terminal points of Red vehicle paths (M1.1)  
b Terminal points of Red DI paths (M1.1) 
c Red Vehicle congregation points (M1.1) 
d Red DI congregation points (M1.1) 
e Vehicle relative positions while in transit (signature formations) 
f DI relative positions while in transit (signature formations) 
g Number of features detected 
h Number of features recognized 
I Number of features identified 
j Locations of detected features 
k Locations of recognized features (by category) 
l Locations of identified features (by category) 
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M1.4 Anticipated Red Activities  
a Number of tracks of duration > n minutes  [n = 5, 10, 15, …] 
b Number of tracks in which targets are correctly identified for > n minutes 
c Number of tracks in which targets are correctly recognized for > n minutes 
d Number of tracks in which targets are correctly classified for > n minutes 
e Number of false targets tracked for > n minutes 
f Number of tracks in which targets are incorrectly classified for > n minutes 
g Number of tracks in which targets are incorrectly recognized for > n minutes 
h Number of tracks in which targets are incorrectly identified for > n minutes 
i Duration of tracks for all categories above 
j Number of features detected through "Change Detection" 
k Number of features recognized through "Change Detection" 
l Number of features identified through "Change Detection" 
m Locations of features detected through "Change Detection" 
n Locations of features recognized through "Change Detection" 
o Locations of features identified through "Change Detection" 
 
Q2.  How effectively are sensor data used to detect and correlate targets? 
   M2.1.  Track Profile and Utility 
a Number of tracks of duration > n minutes; n = 5, 10, … 
b Track identifiers (trks > n min) 
c Target ids (trks > n min) 
d Major and minor axes of position estimates (trks > n min) 
e True target type (trks > n min) 
f Perceived target type (trks > n min) 
g Sensors contributing to establishing/maintaining the track 
h Platforms contributing to establishing/maintaining the track 
I 
Sensor-Platform combinations  (e.g., MWIR/ NFOV - UAV 3) contributing to establishing/ 
maintaining the track 
M2.2.  Time to correlate target acquisitions  
a Number requiring > n minutes from detection to establishing track; n = 5, 10, … 
b Number requiring > n minutes from detection to classification; n = 5, 10, … 
c Number requiring > n minutes from initial acquisition to recognition; n = 5, 10, … 
d Number requiring > n minutes from initial acquisition to identification; n = 5, 10, … 
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M2.3 Effectiveness of Each Sensor System (e.g., MWIR/ WFOV ) 
a Population of targets of each type (function of time) 
b Bubble charts of sensor target interactions (number of interactions)  
c Number of each type target detected by each sensor class (unique entities detected) 
d Number of each type target correctly recognized by each sensor class 
e Number of each type target correctly identified by each sensor class 
f Number of each type target incorrectly recognized by each sensor class 
g Number of each type target incorrectly identified by each sensor class 
h "Failed Detections" by Sensor class due to MDV 
I "Failed Detections" by Sensor class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration 
j "Failed Detections" per Sensor by class due to MDV 
k "Failed Detections" per Sensor by class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration 
l Sensor class providing initial acquisition of each target (may be emission) 
m Sensor class providing initial correct recognition (possibly none) 
n Sensor class providing initial correct identification (possibly none) 
o Sensor classes (PLURAL) responsible for establishing track 
M2.4 Effectiveness of Each Sensor-Platform Class (e.g., MWIR/WFOV - UAV3)  
a Population of targets of each type (function of time) [see M.2.3] 
b Number of each type target detected by each sensor-platform class  
c Number of each type target correctly recognized by each sensor-platform class 
d Number of each type target correctly identified by each sensor-platform class 
e Number of each type target incorrectly recognized by each sensor-platform class 
f Number of each type target incorrectly identified by each sensor-platform class 
g "Failed Detections" by Sensor-Platform class due to MDV 
h "Failed Detections" by Sensor-Platform class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration 
i "Failed Detections" per Sensor-Platform by class due to MDV 
j "Failed Detections" per Sensor-Platform by class due to [each of] bldg/foliage obscuration 
k Sensor-Platform class providing initial acquisition of each target 
l Sensor-Platform class providing initial recognition 
m Sensor-Platform class providing initial identification 
n Sensor-Platform classes responsible for establishing track 
o Sensor-Platform classes responsible for update that "correctly identifies" track 
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M2.5 Effectiveness of Each Platform Class (e.g., UAV3)  
a Population of targets of each type (function of time) [see M.2.3] 
b Number of each type target detected by each platform class (unique entities) 
c Number of each type target correctly recognized by each platform class 
d Number of each type target correctly identified by each platform class 
e Number of each type target incorrectly recognized by each platform class 
f Number of each type target incorrectly identified by each platform class 
g "Failed Detections" by Platform class due to MDV 
h "Failed Detections" by Platform  class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration 
i "Failed Detections" per Platform by class due to MDV 
j "Failed Detections" per Platform by class due to [each of] bldg/foliage/vehicle obscuration 
k Platform class providing initial acquisition of each target 
l Platform class providing initial recognition 
m Platform class providing initial identification 
n Platform classes responsible for establishing track 
M2.6 Sensor platform tasking and retasking responsiveness 
a Time of each sensor request, by type of sensor and platform 
b Type of request (automated retasking, operator decisions, etc.) 
c Time request is received by controlling agent (sensor type and platform) 
d Time task or retask begins (sensor type and platform) 
e Time of arrival of retasked platform in target area 
f Length of retasking chain [how many platforms are retasked serially, parallel?] 
g Outcome [failed to find target][found intended target][found something] 
h Time [if successful] sensor acquires intended target (sensor type and platform) 
M2.7 Timing and events in target prosecution chain 
a Time of initial detection 
b Type of sensor performing initial detection (see M2.3) 
c Type of platform performing initial detection (see M2.3) 
d Time higher level sensor is tasked to query detected target 
e Type of sensor tasked  for higher level acquisition (See M2.3) 
f Type of platform tasked for higher level acquisition (see M2.3) 
g Time of higher level acquisition(s) 
h Type of sensor performing higher level acquisition (see M2.3) 
i Type of platform performing higher level acquisition (see M2.3) 
j Time of declaration "target of interest" 
k Time of declaration "target is recommended" 
l Operator override of sensor-provided track identity (time and  imposed type) 
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Q 3.  What conditions affect Blue capabilities? 
M3.1  Impact of Terrain and Buildings on sensor operations 
a RSS Event Codes for masking (reasons for missed detections) 
b Camouflage State of missed targets in sensor window 
c Number of  false alarms and mis-acquisitions in "n" minute windows 
d Targets never detected [type, number, location]  
e Locations of detected targets [downtown, city parks, highway, shanty town, etc] 
f Location where tracks are established [downtown, city parks, highway, shanty town, etc] 
g Location where tracks are lost [downtown, city parks, highway, shanty town, etc] 
h Time-position history of gaps in tracks 
 M3.2  Temporal effects on sensor operations 
a RSS Event Codes for masking (reasons for missed detections) by time 
b Camouflage State of missed targets in sensor window by time (same as above?) 
c Number of  false alarms and mis-acquisitions in "n-minute" windows 
d Time tracks are established [morning rush hour, midday, evening rush, nighttime, etc]  
e Time tracks are lost [morning rush hour, midday, evening rush, nighttime, etc] 
f Time history of gaps in tracks 
M3.3 Impact of Red Counter Measures on sensor operations 
a RSS Event Codes for masking (reasons for missed detections) 
b Camouflage State of missed targets in sensor window 
c Sensors neutralized/compromised by deliberate Red action 
d Platforms destroyed by Red munitions 
M3.4 Actions most favorable to Red 
a Red formations  when acquired [small group, large group, individual vehicle/DI] 
b Red formations when not acquired [small group, large group, individual vehicle/DI] 
c Red Activity when acquired [on road movement, WMD set up, static, etc] 
d Red Activity when not acquired [on road movement, WMD set up, static, etc] 
e Location where acquired [M3.1] 
f Location where not acquired [M3.1]{where Red is unlikely to be detected} 
g Time when acquired [M3.2] 
h Time when not acquired [M3.2]{when Red is unlikely to be detected} 
M3.5 Communications 
a Histogram of lengths of messages sent (bytes), aggregated and by transmitter type 
b Histogram of lengths of messages received (bytes) 
c Number of messages sent as a function of time, aggregated and by transmitter type 
d Number of messages received as a function of time 
e Number of messages transmitted but not received due to no LOS 
f Number of messages transmitted but not received due to low power (SLMM) 
g Number of messages transmitted but not received due to reasons other than LOS or PWR 
h Histogram of number of lost messages by reason for loss. 
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Appendix B.  Additional Analysis Results 
 
Soldiers, All IDs 
 Trial 
Total 
Detections 
Total 
IDs 
Max 
ID 
Time Mean STD Median r Lr Ur 
Instant-
ID 
01 13309 5082 227.0 6.3 14.9 0.9 2471 0.8 1.1 30% 
02a 2442 1577 34.1 3.9 5.2 0.7 749 0.5 0.9 44% 
02b 2460 1933 71.6 2.2 4.9 0.0 923 0.0 0.2 51% 
03a 2722 1905 575.0 5.3 20.1 0.6 910 0.0 0.9 48% 
04a 1773 1270 77.9 2.9 7.3 0.0 600 0.0 0.0 75% 
S
o
ld
ie
rs
 
04b 1407 1181 95.2 2.0 7.2 0.0 557 0.0 0.0 82% 
 
Other Target Types All IDs 
 Trial 
Total 
Detections 
Total 
IDs 
Max 
ID 
Time Mean STD Median r Lr Ur 
Instant-
ID 
01 8398 1888 265.5 1.3 9.3 0.0 901 0.0 0.0 91% 
02a 4997 839 84.7 0.2 3.2 0.0 391 0.0 0.0 98% 
02b 4140 811 2.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 377 0.0 0.0 98% 
03a 1425 587 451.9 1.7 20.9 0.0 270 0.0 0.0 88% 
04a 5595 1572 27.7 0.2 1.1 0.0 747 0.0 0.0 95% 
O
th
e
rs
 
04b 5394 2195 323.4 0.4 7.3 0.0 1051 0.0 0.0 96% 
 
Artillery Target Types, All IDs 
 Trial 
Total 
Detections 
Total 
IDs 
Max 
ID 
Time Mean STD Median r Lr Ur 
Instant-
ID 
01 367 318 25.1 0.4 2.3 0.0 141 0.0 0.0 93% 
02a 132 49 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18 0.0 0.0 100% 
02b 62 62 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23 0.0 0.0 100% 
03a 66 52 75.6 4.4 14.2 0.0 19 0.0 0.0 69% 
04a 111 87 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 34 0.0 0.0 100% 
A
rt
ill
e
ry
 
04b 83 80 28.4 0.6 3.4 0.6 31 0.0 0.0 91% 
 
 56 
Air Defense Target types, All IDs 
 Trial 
Total 
Detections 
Total 
IDs 
Max 
ID 
Time Mean STD Median r Lr Ur 
Instant-
ID 
01 845 453 240.5 10.2 25.7 0.0 206 0.0 0.0 66% 
02a 206 67 690.9 19.0 86.6 0.0 25 0.0 0.0 81% 
02b 244 48 59.5 4.3 12.6 0.0 17 0.0 0.0 83% 
03a 161 91 484.1 21.1 70.8 0.0 36 0.0 0.0 67% 
04a 370 52 44.7 6.1 11.6 0.0 19 0.0 0.0 71% A
ir
 D
e
fe
n
s
e
 
04b 112 65 71.7 7.4 12.3 0.0 25 0.0 6.9 55% 
 
TEL, WMD, MTT, All IDs 
 Trial 
Total 
Detections 
Total 
IDs 
Max 
ID 
Time Mean STD Median r Lr Ur 
Instant-
ID 
01 637 495 86.0 2.1 8.4 0.0 226 0.0 0.0 88% 
02a 864 143 2.6 2.9 12.9 0.0 60 0.0 0.0 96% 
02b 86 43 54.0 3.0 9.8 0.0 15 0.0 0.0 88% 
03a 31 24 626.8 80.5 176.1 0.0 7 0.0 28.6 63% 
04a 41 34 25.2 0.9 4.4 0.0 11 0.0 0.0 94% 
T
E
L
, 
W
M
D
, 
M
T
T
 
04b 35 25 10.5 0.7 2.2 0.0 8 0.0 0.0 88% 
 
Leaders, All IDs 
 Trial 
Total 
Detections 
Total 
IDs 
Max 
ID 
Time Mean STD Median r Lr Ur 
Instant-
ID 
01 84 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 --- --- 100% 
02a 25 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 --- --- 100% 
02b 6 0 0.0 --- --- --- 0 --- ---  
03a 10 0 0.0 --- --- --- 0 --- ---  
04a 18 9 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.0 2 0.0 0.6 56% 
L
e
a
d
e
rs
 
04b 7 0 0.0 --- --- --- 0 --- ---  
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